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INTRODUCTION
The early twenty-first century has spawned the development and
growth of crowdfunding, a process in which entrepreneurs raise capital
from the general public over the Internet.1 Certain crowdfunding
campaigns, however, constitute securities offerings, triggering
burdensome disclosure requirements under the Securities Act of 1933
(the “Securities Act”).2 Namely, crowdfunding campaigns that offer
investors equity interests must have a registration statement filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).3 Filing a
registration statement, however, is typically impractical for startup
companies and small businesses due to the disproportionately high cost,
the potential for criminal and civil liability, and the potential to miss
critical market windows due to the lengthy filing process.4
In an effort to raise the economy from the Great Recession,
Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS
Act”) in 2012, creating an exemption for certain crowdfunding
campaigns to offer and sell securities without filing a registration
statement with the SEC.5 Critics have denounced the crowdfunding
exemption in the JOBS Act, primarily focusing on the potential for
securities fraud on the Internet, as well as the inability of investors to
properly evaluate a company online.6 The JOBS Act tasks the SEC with
alleviating these concerns through regulatory rules, which must
implement adequate measures to protect investors. In November 2013,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.C.–D.
See id.
See infra Part I.D.2.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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the SEC proposed rules to regulate crowdfunding under the JOBS Act.7
The SEC’s proposal then underwent a period of initial public notice and
comment, which concluded on February 3, 2013. At the time of this
paper’s publication, the proposal awaits further SEC review in light of
the public comments posted.8
This Comment suggests that the SEC’s proposed rules require
crowdfunding entrepreneurs to utilize escrow accounts to adequately
protect crowdfunding investors.9 The SEC’s current proposal does
introduce some use of escrow to this effect, but this Comment argues for
a much more extensive use.10 Specifically, this Comment argues that
the SEC should require crowdfunding campaign managers to (1) place
capital contributions into escrow and release them directly to the parties
responsible for the development or expansion of the business, rather
than the issuer; (2) maintain capital contributions that exceed a
crowdfunding campaign’s target offering in escrow, to be paid to
investors if and when the business fails; and (3) wait one year and offer
to buy out investors before expending capital contributions that exceed a
target offering.11
I. CROWDFUNDING & THE SECURITIES LAWS
Part I.A. of this Comment explores the mechanics of crowdfunding,
its unique capacity for raising capital, and its other benefits to startup
companies and small businesses. Part I.B. outlines the four models of
crowdfunding. Part I.C. sets forth the classification of crowdfunding
campaigns under the securities laws, describing the way in which
crowdfunding campaigns may constitute “securities” offerings. Part
I.D. describes the constraint that the securities laws place on such
offerings. Part I.D.1. illustrates this constraint by looking to a campaign
that sought to crowdfund a beer company before the SEC shut it down
for failing to file a registration statement. Part I.D.2. describes the
reasons that SEC registration is nonetheless impractical for small
businesses and startup companies, which might otherwise benefit from
selling securities through crowdfunding campaigns.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part II.A.
See id.
See infra Part III.
See id.
See infra Part III.B.
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A. WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING?
Crowdfunding is a form of microfinance in which a large “crowd”
of small investors pools together funds in order to provide the necessary
capital for the development of a startup company or the expansion of a
small business.12 Crowdfunding campaigns are primarily conducted
over the Internet, through dedicated crowdfunding-platform websites
called “portals.”13 Through crowdfunding portals, the general public
gains the capacity to fully fund a commercial project or social cause.14
Crowdfunding thus provides an unprecedented source of capital to
startup companies and small businesses, which otherwise face difficulty
obtaining capital investments from traditional lenders due to their
heightened risk or uniqueness.15 Crowdfunding disperses the risks
associated with investing in startup companies and small businesses
amongst a large crowd of small investors, providing entrepreneurs with
large sums of capital without requiring any individual investor to bear a
large capital risk.16
Recent statistics demonstrate both the fundraising capacity and
rapid growth of crowdfunding in recent years.17 In 2010, companies and
individuals raised $890 million through crowdfunding portals.18 In
2011, the number jumped 64% to $1.47 billion.19 In 2012, the number
spiked another 81% to $2.66 billion.20 In 2013, crowdfunding portals
are projected to facilitate $5.1 billion in fundraising, a 91.7% increase
over the prior year.21
In one of 2012’s standout crowdfunding campaigns, Pebble
Technology raised over $10 million through Kickstarter, a North
12. Peter C. Sumners, Crowdfunding America’s Small Businesses After the JOBS
Act of 2012, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 38 (2012).
13. Id. at 40.
14. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-iscrowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
15. Sumners, supra note 12, at 38.
16. Id.
17. See generally Kylie Maclellan, Global Crowdfunding Volumes Rise 81 Percent
in 2012, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/uscrowdfunding-data-idUSBRE9370QY20130408.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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American crowdfunding portal, to finance the development of the
“Pebble” smartwatch.22 Pebble Technology’s founder, Eric Migicovsky,
had already worked on a successful smartwatch that is compatible with
the Blackberry, and then wanted to develop the Pebble for use with the
iPhone and Android.23 Despite his prior success, Migicovsky failed to
secure funding from venture capitalists or angel investors, so he turned
to Kickstarter to raise funds from the crowd.24 Migicovsky began the
Pebble’s Kickstarter campaign with a $100,000 target,25 which he
planned to reach by selling pre-orders of the Pebble for $115, at a $35
discount off the retail price of $150.26 Migicovsky’s Kickstarter
campaign also offered the Pebble in colors other than black for $125, as
well as a two-for-$220 deal.27
The Pebble’s Kickstarter campaign reached its $100,000 target
within its first two hours.28 Only twelve hours into the campaign,
Migicovsky had raised over $500,000,29 and by the end of day three,
Migicovsky had raised $2,656,389 from 18,867 people.30 By the time
the Kickstarter campaign finally concluded after ninety days,
Migicovsky had pre-sold 85,000 Pebble smartwatches, raising
$10,266,845 from a crowd of 68,929 people.31 As of November 6, 2013,

22.
23.

Id.
Deborah Netburn, Pebble Smartwatch Raises $4.7 million On Kickstarter
FundingSite, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/apr/18/business/la-fi-tn-pebble-smart-watch-kickstarter-20120418.
24. Id.
25. Maclellan, supra note 17, at 1.
26. Netburn, supra note 23, at 1–2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Gillian Shaw, Vancouver-Born Entrepreneur’s Pebble Smartphone Breaks
Kickstarter
Record,
THE
VANCOUVER
SUN
(Apr.
16,
2012),
http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2012/04/16/vancouver-born-entrepreneurs-pebblesmartphone-breaks-kickstarter-record/.
30. Anthony Wing Kosner, Pebble Watch for iPhone and Android, The Most
Successful
Kickstarter
Project
Ever,
FORBES
(Apr.
15,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2012/04/15/pebble-watch-for-iphone-andandroid-the-most-successful-kickstarter-project-ever/.
31. Pebble Technology, Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android,
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watchfor-iphone-and-android (last visited Dec. 10, 2013) (Pebble technologies has “gone
from a tiny, 11-person outfit trying to deliver promised smartwatches to its Kickstarter
backers to a growing 40-person business looking to cement its role as a serious player
in wearable technology”).
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Pebble Technologies has sold 190,000 Pebble smartwatches and nearly
quadrupled its staff.32
In addition to its fundraising capacity, crowdfunding also offers
startup companies and small businesses a number of other benefits.33
Notably, crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to hedge risk by gaining
market validation and avoiding equity sales before fully bringing a
product to the market.34 Additionally, crowdfunding campaigns are
powerful marketing tools.35 They have online profiles that may
introduce a venture’s mission and vision, and drive referral traffic
through social media mechanisms incorporated within crowdfunding
portal sites.36 Crowdfunding campaigns also provide entrepreneurs with
comments, feedback, and ideas from the crowd.37 Thus, crowdfunding
not only provides entrepreneurs with capital, but also helps prepare them
to meet the demands of the market awaiting them.38
B. THE FOUR MODELS OF CROWDFUNDING
Four basic models of crowdfunding have emerged: (i) the donation
model, (ii) the reward model, (iii) the pre-purchase model, and (iv) the
equity model.39 Under the donation model, individuals give capital to a
startup company, small business, or charity with no expectation of
repayment in any form.40 Under the reward model, investors make
capital contributions in return for a reward, which may include any
commodity, service, or even mere recognition.41 Under the pre-purchase
model, investors make capital contributions in return for a product that
is under development, to be received if and when the startup company
developing the product successfully launches. If the project fails
32. Ina Fried, With 190,000 Smartwatches Sold, Pebble Boosts iPhone Support,
ALL THINGS D (Nov. 6, 2013), http://allthingsd.com/20131106/with-190000smartwatches-sold-pebble-boosts-iphone-support/.
33. See Tanya Prive, Top 10 Benefits of Crowdfunding, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/10/12/top-10-benefits-of-crowdfunding2/.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Sumners, supra note 12, at 40.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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though, these investors do not receive the product and might even lose
their investment.42 Finally, the equity model of crowdfunding (“equitybased crowdfunding”) gives investors actual equity ownership in a
company in exchange for their capital contributions.43
Of the $2.7 billion in capital that was raised through crowdfunding
portals in 2012, equity-based crowdfunding accounted for only $116
million.44 Lending sites that sell debt45 accounted for $1.2 billion, and
the remaining $1.4 billion went toward ventures offering non-financial
rewards or collecting donations.46 Equity-based crowdfunding is
expected to increase once the SEC adopts rules that enable it under
appropriate regulation.47
C. CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
Equity-based crowdfunding has thus far been trailing behind other
models of crowdfunding,48 but this is because securities laws have
essentially precluded this model.49 The Securities Act mandates that any
entity that sells or offers to sell or purchase a security across state lines
must file a registration statement with the SEC.50 Accordingly, the offer
or sale of a security through a crowdfunding portal must be “registered”
with the SEC, absent an applicable exemption from the Securities Act’s
registration requirement.51 Filing a registration statement, however, is
typically impractical for small business ventures.52 Therefore, startup

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Maclellan, supra note 17.
Debt-based crowdfunding, which may also constitute a securities offering, is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Sumners, supra note 12, at 42–43. The JOBS Act amends securities laws to
facilitate crowdfunding. This topic is discussed in the following section. See infra Part
II.C.1.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
51. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011). A
comprehensive review of the various exemptions set forth under the Securities Act is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
52. See id. at 910.
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companies and small businesses that wish to offer securities through
crowdfunding portals have been hindered by the Securities Act.53
1. Equity-Based Crowdfunding Campaigns as “Securities” Offerings
As a threshold matter, equity-based crowdfunding campaigns are
subject to the Securities Act’s registration requirement because they
constitute interstate offers and sales of “securities.”54 The Securities Act
specifically defines a “security” to include numerous financial
instruments, including an “investment contract.”55 In SEC v. Howey, the
Supreme Court interpreted an “investment contract” under the Securities
Act to include any (i) investment of money, (ii) with an expectation of
profit, (iii) in a common enterprise, (iv) predominantly dependent upon
the efforts of others.56
In SEC v. Howey, W.J. Howey Co. sold investors real property
interests in Florida orange groves, as well as service contracts for the
cultivation and development of the groves,57 in exchange for a share in
the groves’ profits.58 The Supreme Court held that W.J. Howey Co. was
not merely offering and selling land contracts together with service
contracts.59 Rather, the company was offering the opportunity to (i)
invest money by purchasing land and service contracts, (ii) in a common
enterprise of orange grove cultivation and development, where investors
notably did not have physical access to their individual plots within the
orange groves, (iii) with an expectation of profit for the investors, to be
collected from the shared profits of the orange groves, (iv) that
predominantly depended upon the efforts of other (i.e., the groves’
cultivators and developers who were parties to the service contracts).60
Accordingly, W.J. Howey Co. was offering securities in the form of

53.
54.

See id.
Id. at 904 (“[I]t is probable that a court would find that crowdfunding interests
that include a financial return are investment contracts.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(classifying “investment contracts” as a form of “securities” under the Securities Act);
see also SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946) (defining “investment
contracts” under the Securities Act).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
56. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300–01.
57. Id. at 295–96.
58. Id. at 299.
59. Id. at 299–300.
60. Id.
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“investment contracts” under the Securities Act.61 The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that W.J. Howey Co. had violated the Securities Act by
offering and selling securities without filing an accompanying
registration statement with the SEC.62
SEC v. Howey thus sets forth four criteria for an investment
contract,63 and the application of this standard to equity-based
crowdfunding campaigns is mostly straightforward.64 Investments in
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns involve an (i) investment of
money—the purchase of equity,65 with (ii) an expectation of profit—the
expected increase in the value of the purchased equity66 that (iii)
predominantly depends upon the efforts of others—the members of the
operating entity in which the equity is held.67 The common enterprise
criterion for an investment contract security, as interpreted by SEC v.
Howey, however, warrants closer scrutiny.68
The Supreme Court has not defined a “common enterprise,” but
federal appellate courts have adopted three distinct standards for the
commonality of an enterprise.69 The narrowest standard requires
“horizontal commonality,” the gathering of investors’ assets in one
common investment fund.70 Legal scholars disagree whether such
horizontal commonality was actually present in SEC v. Howey.71 The
predominant view is that horizontal commonality was indeed present,
even though investors purchased distinct land contracts, because the
“profit-generating scheme” relied upon these contracts in the aggregate.
72
In other words, the success of an investment depended upon the
success of the entire grove, rather than an individual tract of land.73 A
minority view exists among scholars, however, that horizontal
commonality was absent in SEC v. Howey because investors purchased
distinct tracts of land, and this distinction simply fails to constitute a
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 300–01.
Id.
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 901–04.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902–03.
Id. at 903–04.
See generally id. at 901–02.
See id. at 887.
See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 638 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.
Mass. 1985) aff’d, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
71. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 887, n.37.
72. Id.
73. See id.
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common pooling of assets in a single investment fund.74 Under this
view, the fact that the success of the venture depended upon the tracts in
the aggregate is simply insufficient to render the venture a common
enterprise.75
The Ninth Circuit applies a less restrictive standard, requiring
“strict vertical commonality” to constitute a common enterprise.76 Strict
vertical commonality requires the success of an investment in an
operating entity to be proportionate to the success of the entity itself; the
gain or loss incurred by the investor must be proportionate to the gain or
loss incurred by the operating entity.77 However, the Ninth Circuit is the
only Circuit to adopt this standard.78 Other Circuits apply a third, less
restrictive standard, requiring “broad vertical commonality” to constitute
a common enterprise.79 This highly flexible standard requires the gain
or loss incurred by an investor in an operating entity to be dependent
upon the efforts of the operating entity.80 The gain or loss of investors
need not be proportionate to a gain or loss of the operating entity,
however, and thus the operating entity need not share in the gain or loss
of investors whatsoever.81

74. See id. (citing James D. Gordon III, Defining A Common Enterprise in
Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 73 (2011)).
75. See id.
76. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482, n.7 (9th Cir.
1973) (“A common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the
investment or of third parties.”); see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 888
(noting that the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit has been coined “strict vertical
commonality”).
77. See Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482 n.7; see also Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 51, at 888 (“[St]rict vertical commonality requires a link between
investment performance and promoter remuneration.”).
78. Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for
Common Ground in the “Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ.
BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2008).
79. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974)
(creating the broad vertical commonality standard); see also SEC v. ETS Payphones,
Inc. 408 F.3d 727, 732 (11th Cir. 2005) (adopting the broad commonality standard).
80. ETS Payphones, 408 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he requisite commonality is evidenced
by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the
[operating entity].”).
81. See id.
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Investments in equity-based crowdfunding campaigns typically
satisfy each of the three judicial standards for a common enterprise.82
Horizontal commonality is always satisfied because the pooling of funds
is the “essence” of any crowdfunding campaign, equity-based or
otherwise.83 The success of investors in a crowdfunding campaign
depends upon the collective contributions of all investors in the
campaign, rather than any individual participant, satisfying the liberal,
majority-view of horizontal commonality.84 Even the stricter minorityview of horizontal commonality is satisfied because all investors in a
crowdfunding campaign contribute capital to one common fund.85
Additionally, strict vertical commonality is generally satisfied in
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns because the success of investors
is generally proportionate to the success of the operating entity, insofar
as increases or decreases in the value of equity sold to investors are
proportionate to increases or decreases in the value of the equity held by
the entity.86 If the operating entity does not own any of its own equity
though, then strict vertical commonality will in fact be absent in this
scenario because investors may incur a gain or loss while the entity does
not.87 Finally, broad vertical commonality is satisfied in equity-based
crowdfunding campaigns because the success of investors depends upon
the efforts of the operating entity.88
Therefore, equity-based
crowdfunding campaigns will almost always constitute common
enterprises, in addition to satisfying each of SEC v. Howey’s other
criteria for securities in the form of “investment contracts.”89
D. HOW SEC REGISTRATION CONSTRAINS EQUITY-BASED
CROWDFUNDING
Insofar as equity-based crowdfunding campaigns constitute sales
and offers of investment contract “securities” under SEC v. Howey,”90
the additional fact that crowdfunding campaigns are conducted over the
Internet (i.e., across state lines) subjects them to the Securities Act’s
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 901–02.
See id. at 901.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 901–02.
See id. at 901.
Id. at 902–03.
Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946).
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registration requirement.91 A recent example demonstrates that the
Securities Act may thus apply to equity-based crowdfunding
campaigns.92 In November of 2009, advertising executives Michael
Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow began a crowdfunding campaign
on their own portal website, BuyaBeerCompany.com, seeking to raise
$300 million in order to purchase Pabst Brewing Company (“PBR”).93
The campaign offered investors a “crowdsourced certificate of
ownership” and the value of their investment in beer.94
1. The Campaign to Crowdfund Pabst Brewing Company
At the time, PBR was owned by a private charitable trust, which
had been seeking a buyer for the company.95 However, the attorney
representing Migliozzi and Flatow stated that the two were merely
conducting an experiment.96 Nonetheless, the campaign raised $14.75
million during its first three weeks, and on February 22, 2010, Migliozzi
and
Flatow
issued
a
press
release
announcing
that
BuyaBeerCompany.com had received over $200 million in pledges from
over five million investors.97 On March 15, 2010, an article in The
Daily Deal announced that Migliozzi and Flatow had retained an
attorney, planned to incorporate Buy a Beer Company LLC, and
intended to issue investors stock in the corporation instead of a
certificate of ownership.98 The SEC shut down BuyaBeerCompany.com
for selling securities without filing a registration statement with the
SEC, violating Section 5 of the Securities Act.99 Migliozzi and Flatow

91.
92.

15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
93. Migliozzi, Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at 2011
WL 2246317, 1 [hereinafter Migliozzi, Cease-and-Desist Order] (Order Instituting
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933,
Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Bradford, supra note 92, at 6.
97. Migliozzi, Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 93, at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3; 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (criminalizing the offer or sale of securities
without filing a registration statement, as well as creating a private cause of action).
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entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC, avoiding further
penalties.100
Similarly, under SEC v. Howey, the Securities Act requires all
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns to file registration statements
with the SEC, absent an applicable exemption.101 Filing a registration
statement is typically impractical for startup companies and small
businesses—the ventures that stand to benefit most from equity-based
crowdfunding.102 This impracticality is due to (i) the disproportionately
high cost of drafting and filing a registration statement; (ii) the exposure
to criminal and civil liability that accompanies filing a registration
statement; and (iii) the opportunity costs borne by the lengthy process of
filing a registration statement.103
2. The Cost, Liability, and Operating Risk Associated with SEC
Registration
First, the costs associated with drafting and filing a registration
statement include: (i) underwriter fees; (ii) SEC filing fees; (iii) legal
fees; (iv) accounting fees; (v) printing and engraving costs; (vi) a
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority filing fee; (vii) electronic filing
fees, if applicable; and (viii) transfer agent and registrar fees, if a third
party handles the issuer’s stock records.104 Completing a registration
statement for a small business therefore costs over $100,000 in third
party services alone, in addition to valuable time expended by senior
management in preparing a registration statement and marketing an
offering.105 The cost of drafting and filing a registration statement is
thus disproportionately high relative to the total yield of an offering of
securities to the public (a “public offering”) by a small business.106
Second, filing a registration statement and engaging in a public
offering expose an issuer to a wide range of both civil and criminal
liability.107 Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly
liable to investors if the issuer’s registration statement contains a false

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Migliozzi, Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 93, at 3.
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946).
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 910.
Id. at 907–10.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 908–09.
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statement of material fact or is materially misleading.108 Under Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly liable to investors if the
prospectus in the issuer’s registration statement, or an oral
communication regarding an offering, asserts a false statement of
material fact or is materially misleading.109 Under Section 12(a)(1) of
the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly liable to investors if the issuer
offers or sells securities without filing a registration statement
altogether,110 as well as criminally liable under Section 5 of the
Securities Act.111 Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, an issuer is
also subject to SEC enforcement if the issuer engages in any fraudulent
conduct relating to an offer or sale of securities, irrespective of the
existence or contents of a registration statement.112 Beyond the scope of
the Securities Act, issuers also face liability for securities fraud under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”),113
as well as under Rule 10b-5 of the 34 Act.114
Third, the lengthy process of drafting and filing a registration
statement may cause an issuer to miss “market windows” (i.e., passing
favorable market conditions).115 Drafting and filing a registration
statement usually takes a minimum of several months.116 This extended
time period may cause issuers to miss important, passing financing
opportunities in the market, due to the fact that a registration statement
is pending approval by the SEC or not yet completed by the issuer.117
Missing such market windows could bankrupt a small business that
absorbs the cost of filing a registration statement with the expectation of
capitalizing on these unique opportunities in the market.118
The Securities Act’s registration requirement has thus served to
preclude equity-based crowdfunding campaigns by startup companies
and small businesses.119 The costs of drafting and filing a registration
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1).
15 U.S.C. § 77e.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 910.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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statement are simply prohibitively expensive.120 Yet, even if these costs
were not out of reach, filing a registration statement nonetheless opens
the doors to a slew of criminal and civil liability.121 Additionally, the
lengthy process of filing a registration statement may cause issuers to
miss critical market windows, bankrupting businesses that have
expended the necessary resources to file a registration statement.122
Therefore, the costs of filing a registration statement typically outweigh
the benefits (i.e.. raising capital by offering and selling securities to the
public) for a startup company or small business.123
II. CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT
Part II.A. of this Comment outlines the exemption from registration
that the JOBS Act applies to crowdfunding campaigns. Part II.B.
presents the criticism of this exemption. Part II.B.1. describes the way
in which fraudulent securities were offered over the Internet under Rule
504, and Part II.B.2. describes the fear of similar fraud under the JOBS
Act. Part II.B.3. addresses the concerns over the hidden identities of
crowdfunding campaign managers. Part II.B.4. presents what some
critics view as the room for increased, rather than relaxed, regulation of
crowdfunding campaigns.
A. THE JOBS ACT: TITLE III
In response to the deep economic recession that began in 2008,
Congress sought to stimulate the growth of startup companies by
providing business entrepreneurs with wider access to investment
capital.124 Specifically, Congress aimed to facilitate the nascent use of
equity-based crowdfunding by creating a new exemption from the
Securities Act’s registration requirements.125 Congress set forth this
exemption in Title III of the JOBS Act, which permits startup companies
to sell up to $1,000,000 in securities per twelve-month period, through a
registered crowdfunding-portal or broker-dealer, without filing a

120.
121.

Id.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C §§ 77e, 77k, 77l(a)(1)–(2), 77q(a), 78j(b)); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b–5 (2014).
122. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 907–10.
123. Id.
124. Sumners, supra note 12, at 42–43.
125. Id.
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registration statement with the SEC.126 Instead of filing a registration
statement, startup companies and small businesses offering exempt
securities under Title III need only provide investors with information
that explains the nature of the security being offered and the risks with
which it is associated.127 In addition to this relaxed regulation, the JOBS
Act further incentivizes startup companies and small businesses to
utilize equity-based crowdfunding by requiring investors to hold
securities purchased via crowdfunding portals for a minimum of one
year before selling.128
While Title III of the JOBS Act thus relaxes the regulation of
securities offered through crowdfunding portals, the provision
correspondingly provides a measure of investor protection, restricting
the dollar amount that individuals may invest in such unregistered
securities per twelve-month period.129 Individual investors with an
annual income or net worth under $100,000 may invest up to the greater
of $2,000 or 5% of their annual income or net worth.130 Individual
investors with an annual income or net worth at or above $100,000 may
invest up to 10% of their annual income or net worth, but no more than
$100,000.131 In addition to these caps on individual investments, the
JOBS Act offers further protection to investors in crowdfunding
campaigns by requiring companies offering exempt securities under
Title III to nonetheless comply with any future regulatory rules adopted
by the SEC.132
On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed The JOBS Act
into law,133 commencing a 270-day time period for the SEC to propose
regulatory rules that enact the legislation while duly protecting
investors.134 On October 23, 2013, the SEC finally voted, unanimously,

126. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a),
126 Stat. 306. The JOBS Act thus creates a new form of registration, requiring
crowdfunding portals, rather than issuers, to register with the SEC.
127. Id. § 302(b).
128. See id.
129. See id. § 302(a).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. § 302(b).
133. Sumners, supra note 12, at 42.
134. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, of 2012, Pub. L. No., 112-106, §§ 302–
04, 126 Stat. 306.
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to propose rules implementing Title III of the JOBS Act.135 The SEC’s
proposed rules were published in the Federal Register on November 5,
2013,136 roughly ten months after the original deadline.137 The SEC’s
proposed rules then opened to public comment for a period of ninety
days, which concluded on February 3, 2014.138 The SEC must now
review the public comments and determine whether to adopt or amend
the proposed rules.139 At the time of this Comment’s publication, this
review and subsequent determination are still pending.
B. CRITICISM OF THE JOBS ACT
Various critics have opposed the crowdfunding exemption in Title
III of the JOBS Act.140 The capacity to utilize crowdfunding for fraud
has driven much of the criticism, which is natural in light of the
Securities Act’s focus on protecting investors from fraud.141 Section 7
of the Securities Act prohibits fraud, false statements of material fact,
and material omissions in a registration statement.142 Section 10(b) of
the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the 34 Act further prohibits fraud,
false statements of material fact, and material omissions in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, even beyond the statements

135. SEC,
SEC
Issues
Proposal
on
Crowdfunding,
SEC.GOV,
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370540017677#.Uq5rwGRDtlw (last visited Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter
SEC Press Release].
136. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
137. Some have attributed this delay to the concerns of Mary Schapiro, whose term
as Chairwoman of the SEC ended in December of 2012, over her personal legacy. See
Telis Demos & Jean Eaglesham, SEC Chief Delayed Rule Over Legacy Concerns, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324205404578153693968634504.
138. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
139. SEC Press Release, supra note 135.
140. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 935–36; see also David M.
Cromwell, Comments on Proposed Rule: Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9470, 1 (Oct.
27, 2013), available at 2013 WL 6000302 [hereinafter Cromwell, Comments on
Proposed Rule]; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1763–68 (2012).
141. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 935–36.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
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within a registration statement.143 Yet, in spite of these laws, the
Internet has nonetheless been widely utilized to engage in securities
fraud,144 so much so that the SEC created a web page dedicated to
educating investors about online fraud well before Congress passed the
JOBS Act.145
Critics of the JOBS Act thus view Title III’s
crowdfunding exemption as opening the door to unprecedented levels of
securities fraud on the Internet, by removing the measure of investor
protection afforded by the filing of an issuer’s registration statement
with the SEC.146
1. Fraudulent Securities Offered Under Rule 504
Critics of Title III’s crowdfunding exemption who fear that it will
lead to fraud look to the history of Rule 504 under the Securities Act.147
As originally drafted, Rule 504 provided an exemption from registration
for non-public companies offering $500,000 or less in securities.148 In
fact, Rule 504 originally had no specific disclosure requirements
whatsoever.149 Rather, Rule 504 only prohibited an issuer from
engaging in the general solicitation of investors, unless an issuer’s
offering satisfied state law disclosure requirements.150 Rule 504,
however, lacked any restrictions on secondary trading, which is the
resale of securities by an investor.151 Therefore, as the Internet became
more widely utilized for securities offerings, fraudsters took advantage
of Rule 504’s exemption to engage in fraudulent offerings of exempt
securities on the secondary market.152
In response, the SEC amended Rule 504 by restricting secondary
trades of exempt securities under Rule 504, in addition to its original
restriction on general solicitation, unless such securities comply with the

143.
144.
145.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 935.
See
id.;
see
also
SEC,
Internet
Fraud,
SEC.GOV,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
146. See Hazen, supra note 140, at 1763–68.
147. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (codifying the current version of Rule 504).
148. See Hazen, supra note 140, at 1763.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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disclosure requirements of at least one state.153 This amendment
removed the opportunity for the general public to invest in unregistered
Rule 504 offerings that do not comply with any state law’s disclosure
requirements.154 Critics of the JOBS Act therefore fear that scammers
will take advantage of Title III’s exemption in order to defraud the
general investing public, just as they took advantage of Rule 504’s
exemption before it was amended to remove that opportunity.155
2. The Opportunity for Fraud in Crowdfunding
Critics who fear that Title III’s crowdfunding exemption will lead
to fraud are not cooled by the provision’s cap on individual
investment.156 First, critics argue that the cap will not deter fraudsters,
who can collect small investments of $250 to $500 from myriad
investors.157 Second, critics argue that the defrauding of many small
investors deserves as much protection as the defrauding of a few large
investors.158 Even though Title III’s investment caps limit each
individual investor’s exposure to risk, critics argue that this limitation
does not justify an exemption from filing a registration statement
without substantially meaningful disclosure.159 Critics point out that
small investors may be least able to bear the risk of an investment in a
speculative business.160 Therefore, critics find that Title III’s cap on
individual investment will neither deter scammers nor sufficiently
protect investors in crowdfunding campaigns.161
3. The Masked Identities of Crowdfunding Campaign Managers
In addition to their capacity for fraud, crowdfunding campaigns
have also been criticized for masking the identities of even legitimate
business owners anonymously raising capital on the Internet.162 David
153. Id. at 1763–64; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014) (prohibiting the resale of securities
offered under Rule 504’s exemption from registration, unless the offering complies
with state disclosure requirements).
154. See Hazen, supra note 140, at 1763–64.
155. See id. at 1765.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1765–66.
161. See generally id. at 1763–68.
162. See Cromwell, Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 140.
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M. Cromwell, Adjunct Professor of Entrepreneurship at Yale School of
Management and former head of the venture capital investment business
at JPMorgan, posted in a public comment upon the SEC’s proposed
rules implementing Title III of the JOBS Act:
The Crowd Funding concept is not going to work. Small investors
will lose all their money most of the time, not many extra new
ventures will start up and succeed, and only a few new jobs will be
created on a sustained basis.
Authors of the legislation clearly do not understand successful
venture capital investing and the key success factor. The key
consideration is the management ability of [the] management team
behind the idea, not the idea itself. Can the founders / entrepreneurs
make the idea happen, can they execute the business plan? This is a
tough decision to make and requires a lot of exposure to the
management team.
Incompetent management causes more failures in new business
ventures than all of the other reasons, combined. . . .
As [a] venture investor, you cannot judge the abilities of the
management team over the Internet. Real venture capitalists do not
make their investments over the Internet—they spend hours and
hours interviewing the founders / management team, in person.
Small investors cannot successfully invest over the Internet,
163
either.

In short, Cromwell argues that crowdfunding campaigns fail to
allow investors to make properly informed decisions because investors
cannot evaluate the management team leading a crowdfunding
campaign, and that this is the key consideration in a venture
investment.164
4. The Room for Increased Regulation of Crowdfunding Campaigns
Some critics of the JOBS Act not only oppose Title III’s
crowdfunding exemption, but also argue that crowdfunding campaigns
should be subject to heightened disclosure requirements.165 As a
baseline, crowdfunding campaigns rely upon general solicitation, which
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
See Hazen, supra note 140, at 1766.
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invites more unsophisticated investors who are in need of the protections
normally provided by the Securities Act.166 But some critics go further,
arguing that crowdfunding campaigns warrant even greater disclosure
due to the impersonal nature of the Internet, which limits the available
information about a company to that which the company itself posts on
the portal website hosting its crowdfunding campaign.167
III. HOW ESCROW MAY PROTECT CROWDFUNDING INVESTORS
Escrow accounts may be used to protect investors in crowdfunding
campaigns against fraud, as well as to mitigate the overall risk of
investing in a startup company or small business168. This Comment
recommends that the SEC adopt the use of escrow accounts to these
effects in its rules that regulate Title III of the JOBS Act.169 The SEC’s
proposed rules do in fact incorporate some use of escrow accounts in
This
order to protect crowdfunding investors against fraud.170
Comment, however, argues for a much more extensive use of escrow
accounts than that embraced by the SEC’s current proposal.171
Part III.A. outlines the use of escrow in the SEC’s current proposed
rulemaking. Part III.B. explains the shortcomings of this use in
adequately protecting investors. Part III.B.1. therefore recommends that
the SEC require crowdfunding campaign managers to keep
crowdfunding contributions in escrow after the conclusion of a
campaign, to be distributed to the third parties responsible for the
development of the business. Part III.B.2. further recommends a
requirement for campaign managers to keep crowdfunding contributions
that exceed a target offering in escrow for shareholder security. Finally,
Part III.B.3. recommends that campaign managers only be permitted to
expend crowdfunding contributions that exceed a target offering if they
wait at least one year and first offer to repurchase shares from investors.

166.
167.
168.
169.

See id.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
170. See id.
171. A review of the other anti-fraud measures in the SEC’s current proposal is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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A. THE USE OF ESCROW IN THE CURRENT SEC PROPOSAL
The SEC’s proposed rules require crowdfunding portals to transfer
all contributions to a crowdfunding campaign into an escrow account,
which may only release the funds to the issuer that is operating the
campaign if and when the issuer’s target offering is met or exceeded.172
If an issuer fails to raise funds equal to, or greater than, their target
offering by the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign, then the escrow
account must return all contributions to their respective investors.173
The SEC explains that this use of escrow aims to prevent fraud upon
either issuers or investors.174 Specifically, the proposal’s use of escrow
prevents crowdfunding portals from stealing investor contributions from
issuers that have met or exceeded their target offerings, as well as from
investors who are due the return of their investment if and when a target
offering is not met by the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign.175
B. THE NEED FOR FURTHER USE OF ESCROW
Indeed, the SEC is on the right track in recognizing the value of
escrow accounts in the context of crowdfunding.176 Namely, escrow
accounts ensure that capital is received by its intended beneficiaries.
This is particularly valuable to businesses and investors trading
securities in startup companies and small businesses through
intermediary websites on the Internet. However, the use of escrow
accounts set forth in the SEC’s proposal ceases upon the meeting of, or
the failure to meet, a target offering.177 Thus, the use of escrow accounts
in the SEC’s proposal only protects against fraud for the duration of a
crowdfunding campaign.178 But if and when a successful campaign
reaches its target, and contributions are released from escrow, the issuer
then takes full control over the assets.179 This Comment argues for the
use of escrow beyond this point, in order to protect investors after a
crowdfunding campaign has concluded and a crowdfunding portal is no
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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See id.
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See id.
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longer being employed as an intermediary. The use of escrow accounts
after the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign may protect investors
from future fraud by the issuer, as well as mitigate the overall risk of
crowdfunding investment.
1. The Need to Keep Funds in Escrow After the Conclusion of a
Campaign
First, a target offering should not be released from escrow directly
to an issuer when a crowdfunding campaign meets its target, as the
SEC’s current proposal mandates.180 Rather, the capital should be
released from escrow directly to the parties necessary for the planned
development or expansion of the business. This would require
crowdfunding entrepreneurs to clearly state the intended purpose of the
capital raised from a campaign, as well as the parties intended to realize
that purpose. When funds are released from escrow to these parties,
rather than an issuer, it prevents issuers from defrauding investors
altogether, absconding with their contributions after the conclusion of a
crowdfunding campaign. If the issuer decides to change the course of
action for the initial funds received from the target offering, they should
be required to get the consent of each investor or return their investment.
Otherwise, issuers could tell investors that they are investing in a
venture with a given plan, and then issuers could change that plan after
the conclusion of the campaign, misleading investors entirely.
For example, if an entrepreneur operates a crowdfunding campaign
in order to raise capital necessary for services such as industrial design,
manufacturing, or advertising, then the capital raised from the campaign
should be released from escrow directly to the third parties responsible
for providing these services. If the capital is necessary to hire internal
employees, then the funds should be released from escrow directly to the
employees. If a business decides to use crowdfunded capital for a
purpose other than that stated in the crowdfunding campaign, however,
then the business must get the consent of each investor or return their
investment.
The measure of protection afforded by this proposed use of escrow
is indeed limited by the opportunity for businesses to defraud investors
by paying false employees or service providers. Crowdfunding
campaign managers may falsify employment records or service
contracts, and create shell bank accounts to receive funds from escrow.
180.

See id.
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This opportunity for fraud will likely be seldom recognized, however,
because crowdfunding entrepreneurs typically do not engage in
crowdfunding campaigns in order to hire employees.181 They certainly
may, but this is simply not the typical scenario. Further, even if
crowdfunding entrepreneurs do have the aim to hire employees with
crowdfunded capital, it would be slightly more difficult to defraud
investors by paying false employees than if the capital were released
directly to the issuers.
2. The Need to Keep Contributions Exceeding a Target Offering in
Escrow
Second, escrow accounts may further protect crowdfunding
investors against fraud and the overall risk of investing in a startup
company182 by requiring crowdfunding entrepreneurs to maintain in
escrow capital contributions that exceed a campaign’s target. The SEC
should require that these contributions are kept in escrow after the
conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign, and released to investors, in
proportion to their investment, if and when the business fails. This use
of escrow mitigates the overall risk of investment, allowing investors to
recover part or all of their investment if the business fails. This use of
escrow also prevents issuers from defrauding investors of campaign
contributions that exceed a target offering.
For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has a $100,000 target
and raises $200,000, then $100,000 must be kept in escrow after the
conclusion of the campaign. In this scenario, if the business fails
completely, investors will recover the full value of their investment,
even though they will not see any profits. Naturally, this measure of
protection has its limits. For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has
a $100,000 target and raises $125,000, then investors will only recover
25% of their original investment. Further, if the campaign meets its
target but does not exceed it, then if and when the business fails,
investors will not recover any of their investment.
This use of escrow indeed constrains the flexibility of a business’s
capital expenditure, but this is not devastating to crowdfunding
entrepreneurs. Crowdfunding entrepreneurs set targets that represent the
capital necessary for the planned development or expansion of a
181.
182.

See supra Part I.A.
See Part II.B.
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business. Therefore, if a business raises this necessary capital, it is not
unreasonable to require the business to keep excess capital, which is not
required for the planned development or expansion, in escrow for the
protection of investors.
3. Criteria for Spending Contributions Exceeding a Target Offering
Third, if a business seeks to expend any capital from the pool of
capital contributions that exceed a target offering, which must otherwise
be kept in escrow as shareholder security, then the business should be
required to satisfy two threshold criteria. First, the business should be
required to wait at least one year before expending capital that exceeds
the target offering, just as investors must wait one year before selling
their shares under the JOBS Act.183 Second, the business should be
required notify all investors of the plan to spend the excess capital,
which is shareholder security, and offer to buy back equity from
investors.
For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has a $100,000 target
and yields $200,000 in shareholder equity, then the business may spend
$100,000 as proposed during the first year, and may only spend the
other $100,000 after both waiting one year and offering to buy out each
investor at full value. If the value of the equity increases during that
year, then the business will need to make up for the difference if
investors choose to sell back their shares. This mechanism essentially
renders it impossible for an issuer to defraud investors of capital
contributions that exceed a target offering.
The SEC may thus utilize escrow accounts to protect capital
contributions to crowdfunding campaigns even after the conclusion of a
campaign. The SEC’s current proposal does not go far enough by
preventing crowdfunding portals from defrauding entrepreneurs and
investors during a crowdfunding campaign.184
Investors require
measures of protection after the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign
in order to prevent fraudsters from absconding with capital contributions
or expending capital contributions in a fashion other than that stated in a
crowdfunding campaign. This protection can be achieved by requiring
crowdfunding portals to release contributions directly to the parties
183. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, PUB. L. NO., 112-106, § 302(a), 126
Stat. 306.
184. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
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necessary for the planned development or expansion of a company.
Investor protection may be further bolstered by requiring crowdfunding
entrepreneurs to maintain contributions that exceed a target offering in
escrow, as a sort of shareholder insurance fund. Surely, a venture may
come to need this extra capital, and this need is balanced with the need
for investor protection. Crowdfunding entrepreneurs should therefore
also be required to wait one year after the conclusion of a campaign and
offer to buy out investors before spending capital that exceeds a target
offering.
CONCLUSION
Crowdfunding has the capacity to offer an unprecedented source of
capital to startup companies and small businesses, and merely needs the
appropriate regulation to protect crowdfunding investors.
This
protection may be found in escrow. This Comment therefore urges the
SEC to require crowdfunding entrepreneurs to (i) place capital
contributions into escrow and release them directly to the parties
responsible for the development or expansion of the business, (ii)
maintain capital contributions that exceed a crowdfunding campaign’s
target in escrow, to be paid to investors if and when the business fails,
and (iii) wait one year and offer to buy out investors before expending
capital that exceeds a target offering. These uses of escrow may
adequately protect investors in crowdfunding campaigns, alleviating the
majority of the criticism of the JOBS Act. Therefore, as Title III of the
JOBS Act facilitates the power of crowdfunding, it is now only up to the
SEC to protect investors from its abuse.

